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David Ralph Matthews*

'Constructing' Fisheries
Management: A Values
Perspective1

This paper applies a "social constructionist" position to an understanding of the
nature of fisheries management policy. It argues that both the way in which we
view "nature" and the way in which we view such natural resources of the fishery
are "socially constructed" in terms of particular value orientations and the
interests that these represent. In particular, it examines the value orientations
related to the social construction of the fishery as a biological, social, or economic
resource, as well as the social constructions involved in regarding the fishery as
either common property or a common heritage. It also argues that perspectives
of the fishery in terms of sustainable development adopt a utilitarian approach to
nature rather than an environment centred approach. The paper concludes with
a brief consideration of the way in which these "social constructions" were part of
the 1995 dispute overthe turbot fishery off Canada's east coast and considers the
extent to which such "socialconstruction" have implications for Canada's future
fisheries management policy.
- In the last decade the east coast fishery has occasioned brighter hopes2
and deeper divisions than at any other time in its four hundred year history.
- There was practically nothing to begin with in 1993, and there is now
that nothing minus eighty percent.3
Introduction
This paper is about the nature of values. In particular, it is about those

values which underlie certain 'macro' perspectives concerning the management and regulation of Canada's east coast fishery. Thus, it is about
* Professor of Sociology at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. He has
published extensively on Canada's east coast fishery and fishing communities, including his
book ControllingCommon Property:Regulating Canada'sEast CoastFishery(University of
Toronto Press, 1993). His most recent research deals with the extent to which Canadians
perceive environmental risks and whether they have trust in science and governmental agencies
to deal adequately with them.
1. I would like to thank Lawrence MacDonald for making me aware of the "Common Heritage
of Mankind" literature which is discussed later in this paper, and for our lively conversations
about fisheries policy which have helped shape some of my ideas in this paper. Likewise, I have
benefited from my conversations with Lisa Kidd, whose carefully reasoned analyses have
contributed to my understanding of the 'theories of nature' which are developed in this paper.
2. P.A. Pross & S.McCorquodale, Economic Resurgenceand the ConstitutionalAgenda: The
Caseofthe EastCoastFisheries(Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's
University, 1987) at 11.
3. K. Cox, "Cod Fishery Facing Extinction", quote by Brian Tobin, Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans, The [Toronto] Globe and Mail, 25 Jan., 1995, pp. Al and A6.
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the nature of the underlying values which either presently underlie or
which are likely to ultimately form the basis of Canada's east coast
fishery policy.
Policy is essentially a "goal value system". That is, it is an attempt to
achieve a set of goals based on values which are deemed to be important.
From this perspective, policy can also be considered a "means-ends
schema"-in which certain values are seen as appropriate for defining
both the most appropriate goals and also for determining which are the
most appropriate means for achieving those goals.
Just why particular values are deemed important is, of course, a
significant question and it is a question that has tended to dominate
sociological concern with public policy. For example, Marxist political
theorists have argued that it is inevitably the values of the "dominant"
classes in society which form the basis of state policy. To be sure, the
choice of policy is likely related to the "interests" of those who are in
charge of the state apparatus. However, although the conclusion of this
paper will give some consideration to the issues of "interests" underlying
the choice of fisheries policy, that is not the focus of this paper. Rather,
this paper is limited to an attempt to identify the most prominent
perspectives about the nature of fisheries management and to an examination of the value orientations that are inherent in each of them. In doing
so, it is our assumption that a greater awareness of these underlying value
orientations will enable us to identify more clearly the alternatives which
are being proposed with respect to Canada's fisheries management "after
the collapse", and that this in turn will assist us in determining our most
appropriate policy directions for the future.
The orientation to be taken here is largely a "social constructionist"
one. As this is a framework which, though relatively common in sociology, is not necessarily known in other disciplines, some brief introduction
to it is probably desirable. The underlying assumption of this perspective
is that people live in an inter-subjective, socially constructed world, and
that the events and situations they encounter are defined and interpreted
in terms of these social constructions.4 These "orientations" or social
constructions, over time, come to be standardized and socially accepted
as appropriate ways for viewing reality. Those familiar with the work of
Thomas Kuhn5 may recognize these perspectives, when accepted by a
"community" of thinkers, as what Kuhn refers to as paradigms. Thus, it

4. Compare P.L. Berger & T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1967).
5. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1970).
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is common in many disciplines to examine and describe the "paradigm
shifts" that have occurred over time.
However, the concept of paradigm has become so widely used and has
taken on so many meanings 6 that it is now virtually useless. Partly for that
reason, we choose to describe the social constructions that occur with
regard to policy in terms of changing "metaphors". From this perspective,
metaphors are not simply linguistic elements, but conceptual conventions
whereby we describe a set of occurrences as having distinctive characteristics or properties similar to other aspects of the natural, social, or
physical world. 7 By describing these orientations as metaphors, we
emphasize the 'constructed' nature of our perspectives and our realization that the way in which we verbally depict an empirical social reality
is not necessarily solely a reflection of what exists, but is also a reflection
of the way in which we are predisposed to think about and describe it. It
also implies that, when a prevalent metaphor changes, the fundamental
understandings that we have of the phenomenon in question also change.
In the words of Archibald MacLeish, "A world ends when its metaphor
8
has died".
Without making this orientation explicit, this writer has recently
examined the "change in metaphors" of Canadian fisheries officials that
occurred during the 1970s. During this period, they moved from a
biologically driven understanding of Canada's east coast inshore fishery
to a perspective which viewed it as open access "common property". 9 My
work documented that there was virtually no evidence to support such a
conception. Nonetheless, Canada's whole pattern of fishery regulation
and management came to be based on that assuniption. That is, fisheries
management policy is both a reflection of the socially constructed
"metaphors" we employ in our understanding of the fishery, as well as an
embodiment of them. In that sense, fisheries policies and regulations can
be understood as the official codification of our social constructions.
In the remainder of this paper we will examine some of the major
"metaphors" which are involved in fisheries analysis and consider the
implications of these for the regulation and management of Canada's east
coast fishery. We will do this on three different levels. First, we will

6. D.L. Eckberg & L. Hill, "The Paradigm Concept and Sociology" (1979) 44 Amer. Sociol.
R. 925.
7. Compare R.H. Brown, A Poeticfor Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988); S. Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969).
8. Found in H.J. Bergman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal
Traditions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) at v.
9. R. Matthews, Controlling Common Property:Regulating Canada'sEast Coast Fishery
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
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examine the metaphors whereby we describe nature itself. Even though
nature may be "out there" in some Kantian sense, we know nature through
our ways of describing it. Thus, a fundamental starting point for any
consideration of fisheries policy is a consideration of the ways in which
our understanding of the fisheries, as part of nature, may be shaped and
changed. Second, we will examine the predominant metaphors that are
inherent in social versus economic perspectives on the fishery and, in
doing so, we will address the question, "Does Canada want a social or an
economic fishery?". Third, we will consider the major political-legal
metaphors which underlie the fishery and which are embodied in the
phrases "common property" and "common heritage". Underlying much
of these considerations will be a concern with yet one more metaphor, that
of "sustainability", and we will examine it in the context of both socioeconomic and political-legal perspectives on sovereignty. The paper will
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our analysis for fisheries
policy and management on Canada's east coast "after the collapse".
I.

The Social Constructionof Nature

Fish, like all other living things, are part of nature. That nature is not just
something external to us, is self evident. We are also part of nature, though
we have far greater potential of altering the eco-system of which we are
a part than is true of the other parts of nature. This awareness of our place
in nature constitutes the basis of virtually all environmental science. But
the understanding of our role with respect to the rest of nature varies
considerably, depending on whether we emphasize the intrinsicright of
nature to protection 0 or focus on nature in an instrumental and utilitarian
way as being available for our use and that of future generations. Clearly,
throughout most of our history, most of mankind has regarded or
'constructed' nature in this latter, instrumental manner. Only in recent
times has there been any substantial movement to regard nature as having
"natural rights" of its own, primarily because our instrumental treatment
of many of our significant natural resources has threatened its, and our,
very existence. Hence, in this most fundamental sense, the way in which
we undertake to regulate and manage our natural resources rests on our
"social construction" of them as having either their own rights or as
instrumental to our needs."

10. R.F. Nash, The Rights of Nature:A Historyof EnvironmentalEthics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
11. The positions being identified here are those which constitute the basic 'ethical'
perspectives on nature in western society. It essentially contrasts the perspective of nature
inherent in industrialism with that which underlies the "deep ecology" movement. Those
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Besides these fundamental differences in the way we construct our
fundamental conceptualizationof nature, there is a more direct way in
which nature is socially constructed. We "know" nature in terms of the
way we describe it and regulate it. This relativistic perspective has been
the basis of phenomenological philosophy and sociology for over a
century. 2 However, that tradition has usually focused on the way in
which individuals regard their immediate social world and the others in
it, and it is still rare to see the perspective applied to broader issues of
environment and resource development. 3 Viewed from this phenomenological or constructionist perspective, the meaning of nature is not a
constant, but varies in terms of the frame of reference we bring to it. One
need look no further for evidence of this than the two quotes which begin
this paper. In 1987, two prominent political scientists described the
Atlantic fishery as experiencing a time of "bright hope". 4 Just eight years
later, the federal fisheries Minister described that same fishery as nonexistent. The focus of the two political scientists, like that of most
fisheries economists and biologists of the time, was on the increased
catches by Canadian fishermen that had resulted from Canada's implementation of the 200 mile limit. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans was
responding to the fact that, partly as a result of these increased catches,
the fishery no longer is commercially viable and may even face extinction. In short, the fishery, like all other aspects of life, is ultimately at the
mercy of the frame of reference with which we understand it. Likewise,
the way in which the fishery is to be regulated is also subject to, and
perhaps even victim of, these same frames of reference.
Within social science and among policy makers, one of the ways of
expressing competing constructions or metaphors of the fishery has been
to question whether one wishes a "social" fishery or an "economic" one.
Any attempt to restructure the fishery in the wake of its recent collapse

interested in further discussion of these positions, see A. Schnaiberg & K.A. Gould, Environment and Society: The Enduring Conflict (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994); A. McLaughlin,
RegardingNature: IndustrialismandDeep Ecology (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1993). The Intermediate "ecological limits" perspective will be considered later in this
paper.
12. Compare A. Schutz, Collected Papers 1: The Problem of Social Reality (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 196"1); Berger & Luckman, supra note 4.
13. L.L.N. Evemden's recent book The Social Creation of Nature (Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1992) is, in some ways, an exception to this generalization in that
he accepts and focuses on the way in which nature has beei regarded over the past two
centuries. However, he does not rest his analysis in the phenomenological position used here,
nor does he appear to accept the "relativity" of nature in the same way that the concept is used
here. Rather, his book is largely an appeal for the acceptance of the rights of nature as an
alternative to our alternative social constructions of it.
14. P.A. Press & S. McCorquodale, supra note 2 at 11.
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must consider this issue. At the moment, it is relatively clear that those
who favour an economic fishery are in the ascendency, despite the fact
that it was an emphasis on high economic gain which contributed
significantly to the collapse of the fishery in the first place. Given this, it
remains relevant to continue to examine the values inherent in the two
positions that form the social versus economic alternatives to fisheries
management.
II.

An Economic Versus Social Fishery?: The Social
Construction of Value(s) and Sustainability

Pross and McCorquodale have noted that, in the 1970s and early 1980s,
Canadian fishery policy "became encapsulated in a single, distorting" or
'false dichotomy', namely, "Does Canada want a social fishery or an
economic fishery"? ' 15 They argued that this formulation was "simply
reiterating what had been Ottawa's view since the late 1950s: that the
fishery can only be successful if it eliminates its pool of surplus labour."16
These authors are correct in asserting that this is a "false dichotomy"
as the fishery is simultaneously both a socio-cultural way of life and an
economic resource. However, it should not be concluded from this that
fishery management based on socio-cultural values is compatible with
that based on economic ones. In fact, there are not just two competing
metaphors of the nature of the fishery and the role of fishery management
interwoven here, but three: a socio-cultural one, an economic one, and a
biological/ecological one. The inter-relationship of these metaphors and
their implications for fisheries management need careful differentiation.
The socio-cultural metaphor concerning the value of the fishery is
perhaps best encapsulated in the phrase "[f]ishermen do not fish only
from individual boats; it is fair to say that they also fish only from
communities". 7 This position frequently argues that the dominant value
to be gained from the maintenance of the fishery is the preservation of a
rural, community based way of life that is highly valued by its participants. This position sometimes also incorporates an economic rationale.
This can take two forms: a more "negative" one in which it is argued that
the fishery as the employer of last resort is thus able to provide income to
persons who would otherwise be destitute given their lack of training and
the unavailability of alternative employment; or a more "positive" one
which argues that the actual economic value gained from the prosecution

15.
16.
17.

Ibid. at 28.
Ibid.
Matthews, supra note 9 at 5.
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of a community based (and usually small boat) fishery enables a far
greater number of persons to survive in a mixed economy than would be
the case if the equivalent catch were harvested more efficiently using
large scale operations and high technology.
A fourth variant of the "social fishery" metaphor is one which
explicitly denies primacy to market-based economic principles. It argues
that a focus on market-based economic dimensions under-values both the
complexity and positive attributes of social life and that, in addition to
conditions of economic viability, it is also necessary to consider aspects
of social vitality when assessing the overall well-being of a community
or region. 8 Such a position emphasizes that the "community" itself is
both a social and an economic "product", and that it should be included
in any assessment of the "viability" of the fishery. This perspective, thus,
radically challenges the pre-eminence of economic considerations in any
assessment of the fishery by denying primacy to purely market aspects of
fishing activity. Given this, it is understandable why economists are
tempted to describe this approach as a glorification of traditional rural
community life and values.1 9

The alternative model, namely that of an "economic" fishery, is
frequently described as based on two dominant criteria: "efficiency" and
"maximum economic yield" (MEY). From this perspective, the economically desirable fishery is one which harvests the greatest economic
value with the least expenditure of economic effort. 20 Despite the apparent simplicity of this formulation, as even some economists are quick to
point out 21 , the unique nature of the fishery resource makes such a goal
difficult and perhaps even impossible to achieve. The primary reason is
that any concept of economic efficiency, when combined with the
concept of sustainableyield, involves a mixture of biological measures
with market economic ones.
Even though maximum sustainable yield (MSY) may be expressed as
an economic goal, in reality, it is primarily a biological one. The criterion
of sustainability implies that fishing effort should not exceed the maximum number, size, and/or weight of fish which can be abstracted from the
available pool without damaging the future productivity of that stock.

18.

R. Matthews, There'sNoBetterPlaceThan Here:Social Changein ThreeNewfoundland

Communities (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1976).
19.

P. Copes, The Resettlement of FishingCommunitiesin Newfoundland (Ottawa: Canadian

Council on Rural Development, 1972).
20.

F.T. Christy & A. Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries:Some Problems of

Growth and Economic Allocation (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965) at 216-217; J.R.
McGoodwin, Crisis in the World's Fisheries(Stanford University Press, 1990) at 72-75.
21. Compare F.T. Christy & A. Scott, ibid.
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This is clearly a difficult demand when the resource itself is hidden, its
size and reproduction rates are uncertain, and the full range of factors
affecting its reproduction and growth are unknown. Furthermore, in
economic terms, the criteria used to establish maximum sustainable yield
are frequently at odds with those involved in establishing the parallel
economic concept of "maximum sustainable rent" (MSR). The maximum sustainable rent of any fishery resource is essentially the maximum
amount of profit which can be gained in relation to the effort expended.
Thus, whereas MSY is a criterion of biological limitation, MSR is a
judgement of economic efficiency. Despite the fact that the two are
frequently considered in tandem by policy makers 22, they frequently can
not be accomplished simultaneously, as the satisfaction of one may well
be at the expense of the other. This has to do with the fugitive nature of
the fishery resource (a primarily biological/ecological dimension).
Fish are a fugitive resonTce. That is, they are capable of moving
themselves and, in order to harvest them, they must be captured. It is this,
rather than the oft cited common property nature of the fishery, which
makes it difficult to establish effective management or to determine
MSY. Because of their fugitive nature, fish which are being regulated
under one management scheme operating on one set of social, biological,
and economic values, can move into another jurisdiction where a different set of values govern the regulatory structure.
Furthermore, this fugitive character of the resource has both social
psychological and economic implications for fishery management. For
example, at the social psychological level, the fugitive character of the
fishery turns fishermen into hunters and gatherers, whose primary interest is in capturing the resource, not husbanding it as might be true of
farmers. Likewise, at an economic level the fugitive character of the
resource may make it economically efficient to capture more than is
biologically sustainable while that resource is in one's particular area.
This is because there is no guarantee that the resource will return to one's
area or that others, fishing elsewhere and operating with a different set of
values and regulations, will conserve the resource at a level that is
sustainable. In terms reminiscent of post-modernist analysis, the fugitive
character of the fishery frequently comes down to a consideration of the
cultural and political values and meanings attached to space and territoriality. Indeed, this fugitive character constantly threatens the survival of
local (and often traditional) social and economic patterns as these become

22. See Canada, Chartinga New Course:Towards the Fishery of the Future:Report of the
Task Force on Incomes and Adjustment in the Atlantic Fishery (Ottawa: Communications
Directorate, Fisheries and Oceans, 1993) (Chair: R. Cashin) at 99 for an example.
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dependant on the "globalization" of social relations and regulatory
structures. 23 We will focus on the jurisdictional implications of this
process in a later section of this paper.
It should also be noted that the economic value of any resource is
affected by yet two other factors which frequently interact with one
another, namely the number of persons involved and the time period
under consideration. For example, the rent-value for any individual may
be different than the rent-value for the group as a whole. Thus, one or a
small number of efficient fishers can maximize a high level of rent over
a short period, but do so at the expense of the long term rent of the larger
group of fishers who may have access to the resource.
Furthermore, the passage of time may also result in a "reconstruction"
of both the social and economic meaning of any environmental resource,
and the fishery is no exception. A harbour or coastal zone at one time in
history may be valued as a depository for effluent and at that time this may
well be an economically rational action. However, changing societal
conditions and values may alter both the social and economic meaning of
that resource so that it becomes valued for its potential as a fish and game
habitat, for its potential as a tourist attraction, or even for health or ascetic
reasons. In sum, the economics of fishery management is not only subject
to the vissitudes (and metaphors) of space transformation, but it is also
affected by different orientations over time.
This section has attempted to demonstrate the wide range of social,
economic and biological factors and issues which may influence the
"social construction" that ultimately underlies how one chooses to
manage a fisheries resource. However, before concluding, it is relevant
to consider the one metaphor that has come, in recent years, to significantly dominant how the relationships amongst these factors are perceived. This is the perspective of "sustainable development" which,
particularly since the 1987 publication of the Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development (known generally as
"The Bruntland Report")24 , has dominated world environmental and
socio-economic planning.
This over-arching metaphor of sustainable development contains
virtually all of the socio-cultural, biological, economic, spacial and
temporal elements which we have just identified as relevant to an
understanding of the nature of fisheries regulation. The Bruntland Report

23. Compare A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1990) at 64.
24. Our Common Future, the Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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defines sustainable development as ". . . development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".25 The Report itself emphasizes that this
concept involves placing priority on the "needs of the world's poor .. .
and the ... limitations imposed by the state of technology and social
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future
needs."26 Micheal Jacobs has described this as a focus on both equity and
conservation. 27 However, in addition to these two dimensions, the
sustainability perspective (as noted above) is essentially a bio-centric
concept with an explicit emphasis on inter-generational obligation which
adds, in essence, a time dimension. Indeed, sustainable development
emphasises the redistribution of resources in relation to need, while at the
same time emphasizing that the biological basic of the resource must be
the fundamental consideration. Thus, in many respects, its dominant
assumptions are closer to the social ones highlighted earlier than to the
strictly economic ones that we have described.
Common Property, Common Heritage
and the Question of Sovereignty
In addition to social and economic questions, the management and
regulation of Canada's fisheries resources also involve political questions related to ownership, control and jurisdiction. Elsewhere, we have
discussed the "common property" status of the fishery and have argued
that it is "the mobility of fish" (i.e. their fugitive character) which has
given rise to the belief that they are common property,' Thus, it is usually
argued that the mobility of fish is the reason for their "common property"
status, and their property status, in turn, is the cause of resource depletion.
However, despite the pervasive use of this metaphor, there is little
empirical evidence to support it. Indeed, any fishery stock may, over the
course of time, move through three regulatory regimes.
When they are near-shore, fish are clearly not common property as
there is ample evidence that they are regulated both by local communities
and state agencies. However, since 1977, the Law of the Sea Conventions
have given Canada jurisdiction to manage fisheries within a 200 mile
limit of its shores, with the result that the fish there are certainly not
common property and may, in some senses at least, be regarded as state
III.

25. Ibid. at 43.
26. Ibid.
27. M. Jacobs, The GreenEconomy: Environment,SustainableDevelopmentandthe Politics
of the Future (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993) at 58-61.
28. Matthews, supra note 9 at 92.
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property. The most significant characteristics of the Law of the Sea
Conventions with regard to the fisheries is, indeed, the extension of state
regulatory sovereignty to an "Exclusive Economic Zone" (EEZ), thereby
effectively ending any common property status to fishery resources
within that area.
However, since the promulgation of regulations setting up such zones,
another regulatory framework has been proposed aimed at covering both
the EEZs and the areas which fall outside them. This is the "Common
Heritage of Mankind" model first expounded in 1971 by Ambassador
Arvid Pardo of Malta during the Law of the Sea deliberations. In Pardo's
words:
The oceans involve the interests of all, and all must therefore work together
to establish an equitable regime beneficial to all. Present law of the sea
based on freedom and sovereignty is being rapidly eroded by technology
and events and is, in any case, incapable of providing a lasting framework
for the beneficial use of ocean space under present conditions. A new basis
for a new regime must be created.
It appears that only the concept of the ocean space and its resources as a
common heritage of mankind can provide a satisfactory framework for an
equitable international order and, at the same time, insure the preservation
of the marine environment and the management of living and non-living
resources in the interests of all.29
The "common heritage of mankind" perspective is already accepted
within certain United Nations contexts as a framework for dealing with
undersea mineral resources and now efforts are being made to extend this
approach to fishing resources. In particular, it is seen as a solution to the
problems raised by "straddling stocks",-those fish stock which move
from between the 200 mile jurisdiction and international waters. Thus, it
is important to examine the regulatory assumptions underlying this
perspective.
First and foremost, the "common heritage of mankind" approach
places an emphasis on the management and sharing of resources rather
than ownership of them. E.M. Borgese contends that this would constitute a situation of "no property".
"The first implication is non-appropriability-that is, the common heritage can be used but not owned. It is an area where there is no property." 30

29. A. Pardo, "New Institutions for Ocean Space" in E.M. Borgese & D. Krieger, eds., The
Tides of Change: Peace, Pollution and Potential of the Oceans (N.Y.: Mason/Charter
Publishers, 1975) 324 at 325. [emphasis added].
30. E.M. Borgese, The Future of the Oceans: A Report to the Club of Rome (Montreal:
Harvest House, 1986) at 43.
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Indeed, such a framework might provide the auspices for a truly international "common property". Even so, one should not lose sight of the fact
that it has not been the "common property" character of the fishery which
has presented problems. Rather, the difficulty has been in controlling
open access to the fishery. Significantly, those who adopt a "common
heritage of mankind" metaphor for understanding the fishery appear to
have given relatively little consideration to how such access will be
regulated and what mechanism will be necessary to enforce it. The
assumption appears to be the nation states bordering the fishing grounds
will still play a dominant role in the regulation and management of the
fishery, based on the principles of peaceful sharing and conservation. Just
why these nations would give up their vested interests in protecting fish
stocks for their own predominant use within a 200 mile limit to undertake
such actions is not clearly addressed, though it seems to be assumed that
sovereign states will be motivated by some combination of humanitarian
desire to help distant nations and an awareness of the need to conserve the
eco-system as a whole.
Be that as it may, this emphasis on sharing and conservation is of
particular significance for it appears to be a direct embodiment of the
principles underlying sustainable development that were discussed earlier-namely equity, conservation, and inter-generational obligation. In
short, the "common heritage of mankind" metaphor is primarily the
sustainable development metaphor, re-formulated as a regulatory schema
for the regulation of the access to and sharing of resources lying outside
the limits of any sovereign state.
IV.

Assessing Metaphors:FisheriesRegulation
After The Collapse
This paper has sought to bring to the forefront the assumptions underlying
various conceptualizations of the fishery and its management and, in so
doing, to provide some guide to the values and orientations implicit in
each perspective. It has been our contention that these value orientations
constitute metaphoric "ways of seeing" which affect not only how we
define the situation with respect to the fishery, but also what we regard as
the appropriate way of managing it. What, then, are the most obvious
implications of this analysis for fisheries management in the "post
collapse" future?
It is significant that, during the period in which this paper was being
written, the Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans was publicly
defending Canada's use of force to police the perceived over-fishing of
turbot (Greenland halibut) in the area outside Canada's 200 mile fisheries
protection limit. In doing so, he stated:

56

The Dalhousie Law Journal

The fleet that is out there is the same fleet that destroyed, one after another,
the fisheries that have sustaineda way of life for 600 years.3
It is of interest that Mr. Tobin attempted to justify his actions on the
need to preserve "sustainability". As we have demonstrated, the metaphor of sustainability is largely a bio-centric perspective. However, it is
obviously also coming to be regarded as both an economic and a social
strategy. Indeed, it is particularly significant that Mr. Tobin also attempted to justify his actions in terms of the need to sustain a socially
viable "way of life", and thereby provided a direct link between biological sustainability and socio-cultural needs.
As we have noted elsewhere" and as the quotations from Pross and
McCorquodale previously given attest, this concern for a "social" fishery
is relatively recent in federal fisheries circles. Most Canada Fisheries and
Oceans policy statements have treated sustainability as largely an economic issue related to the need to maintain stable economic growth.
Traditionally, the "social" fishery argument has been championed by the
provinces-most notably Newfoundland. Thus, it is not surprising that
the Premier of Newfoundland, Mr. Clyde Wells, declared his complete
support for Mr. Tobin's actions, going as far as to assert that such actions
were taken "in the interest of mankind".33 In making such statement, Mr.
Wells also chose to legitimate his position with reference to ideas implicit
in the "sustainable development" position and made explicit in the
"common heritage of mankind" arguments. However, what is clearly
missing from such formulation is any explicit awareness of those aspects
of the sustainable development metaphor that deal directly with issues of
equity and with redistribution in accordance with need. To date, there has
been little or no need to consider this aspect of the sustainability
metaphor, in part because the fish stocks that were in most need of
protection have been clearly and incontestably threatened with extinction, and in part because the primary action with regard to "sustaining"
such fish stocks has involved regulation of fishing within the 200 mile
coastal limit. However, the "turbot war", in which Canada chose to
directly challenge the right of European Union nations to fish in international waters on the "nose" and "tail" of the Grand Banks which lie
outside this territorial limit, clearly indicated that this situation will not
long remain. Thus, European Community spokespersons described
Canada's boarding and seizure of Spanish vessels fishing in these
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international waters as "acting in violation of the International Law of the
Sea"34 and, declared that Canada was engaging in open "piracy"."
It should be obvious, however, that if Canada is going to attempt to
regulate fisheries on the basis of a need to maintain the sustainable
development of fish stocks in the interest of mankind, some clear
mechanism must be found whereby these various competing interests can
either be met or adjudicated. Unless that happens, and soon, each country
will continue to protect its own interests in much the same manner that
each individual under the supposed conditions of common property was
motivated to exploit the resource in his or her own individual interest.
Moreover, in attempting to act as mankind's police officer in this
instance, it is also all too clear that Canada was obviously operating in its
own interests as well. Indeed, Canada was acting as much out of its own
interest, as out of any desire to protect the interests of mankind. After all,
these Spanish and Prtuguese fishermen, their famil es and their communities are part of the "mankind" that would directly suffer from such quota
limitations. Canada likely would have protested as vociferously as Spain
and other European countries had the situation been reversed.
Which brings us, in a somewhat roundabout way, to the point with
which we started this paper. Nature can be viewed either as an "intrinsic"
good with value in and of itself, or as an "instrumental" good with value
primarily in terms of how mankind can benefit from it-either in the
present or with respect to future generations. While arguments and claims
for the need to protect a fishery that are predicated on the grounds of
"sustainability" or the "good of mankind" may appear to rest on pure
altruistic concerns, this is not the case. Such arguments are clearly part of
an "instrumental" perspective which sees the value of nature, not in its
own terms, but in terms of its value to us or our descendants.Put another
way, all such arguments rest on values related to self and national interest.
In sum, "sustainability" is about interests and not altruism, and about
the needs of mankind rather than about the needs of nature. Until that is
clearly recognized and management systems are developed to regulate
the interests involved, then the fishery-like the rest of nature-remains
endangered.
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